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Abstract
Two experiments investigated positive priming and negative priming effects in a lexical decision task. A priming task was used in
which participants were required to make a verbal naming response to a prime target word, flanked by a distractor word, followed
by a lexical decision response to a probe target word or nonword, flanked by a distractor word. The longevity of both positive and
negative primingwas explored in short-lag and long-lag conditions in which stimuli were presented once and only once, except in
order to fulfill the priming manipulations. The results showed significant immediate positive priming and negative priming
effects, but only negative priming was sustained for over 8 minutes with many intervening trials, whereas there was no evidence
of positive priming after the same delay. These intriguing results have implications for the nature of inhibitory processing and
differing predictions between inhibition-based and episodic retrieval accounts of priming.
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People are continuously exposed to a large amount of visual
sensory information, and thus mechanisms are needed to en-
sure that overload does not occur. Consequently, psycholo-
gists have become interested in how humans apply strategies
to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant information
(Strayer & Grison, 1999). It has been established that unwant-
ed, covert responses, created automatically by visual process-
es, can be induced without any conscious plan to do so. In
order to control these nonconscious responses, it is imperative
that we have the ability to inhibit responses that may not be
desirable for the current task (Tipper, 2001).
Negative priming
The negative priming phenomenon has been useful for investi-
gating the mechanisms underpinning visual selective attention
and, in particular, the possibility that an active inhibitory mech-
anism suppresses conflicting, “to-be-ignored” information (e.g.,
Christie & Klein, 2008; see Frings, Schneider, & Fox, 2015, for
a review). A typical negative priming experiment involves using
trial couplets containing a prime display followed by a probe
display, with each containing a target stimulus that the partici-
pant responds to and an irrelevant distractor that is ignored. The
ignored repetition (IR) condition involves the distractor in the
prime display either matching, or being highly similar to, the
target in the probe display. In the control condition, there is no
relationship between the four stimuli in a prime–probe couplet.
Negative priming effects are evidenced by slower, or more er-
ror-prone, responses on IR trials compared with control trials.
The observation that an ignored distractor can influence later
behavior demonstrates that this distractor must be processed in
someway—either consciously or nonconsciously. However, the
exact mechanism as to how this occurs is widely debated. There
are two main theories of conceptual negative priming—inhibi-
tion-based and episodic retrieval (Neill & Valdes, 1992).
Inhibition-based theory
The inhibition-based theory claims that momentarily irrele-
vant and distracting information is actively inhibited as a func-
tion of target selection (e.g., Neumann & DeSchepper, 1991,
1992; Neumann & Levin, 2018). Proponents of this theory
contend that the inhibition of distracting information is as
equally necessary for selective attention as the activation of
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target information (see also Cerf et al., 2010). A critical feature
of the inhibition account of negative priming is that it operates
in a “forward” direction, starting at the prime display and
continuing to the subsequent probe display. When the prime
stimuli are displayed, the ignored object is actively inhibited,
and this inhibition carries forward, creating impairment when
the ignored item becomes a target on the probe display (e.g.,
Fox & DeFockert, 1998).
Episodic retrieval theory
The episodic retrieval theory of negative priming was proposed
byNeill andValdes (1992) after a series of experiments in which
a decrease in the magnitude of negative priming was found as
response-to-stimulus intervals (RSIs) increased. This relation-
ship was demonstrated by an exponential decay function where-
by differences in negative priming were harder to detect at long
RSIs as opposed to short RSIs. Neill and Valdes (1992) discov-
ered that this decay function of negative priming was similar to
characteristic decay functions that have been reported for both
sensory memory (Sperling, 1960) and short-term memory
(Peterson & Peterson, 1959). Logan’s (1988) theory of automa-
tization proposed that behavior, and therefore subsequent per-
formance, can be mediated by the retrieval of prior processing
episodes involving the same stimuli. In line with Logan’s ideas,
the episodic retrieval account of negative priming suggests that
task reaction times can vary due to retrieval of certain episodes.
These episodes contain both identity information and informa-
tion pertaining to whether the prime display itemwas previously
a target (respond tag) or a distractor (do-not-respond tag).
Hence, when the probe trial is displayed, the memory of the
previous prime trial is elicited and interferes with the response
in ignored repetition (IR) trial couplets where there are conflict-
ing response tags (i.e., “do not respond,” “respond”). It is the
extra time required to overcome the conflicting tags in the IR
condition, compared with the control condition, that produces
negative priming. Unlike the inhibition account, episodic re-
trieval works in a “backward” direction with the probe trial
target acting as a memory retrieval cue.
Temporal discrimination theory
A third account of negative priming phenomena is the tempo-
ral discrimination theory (Milliken, Joordens, Merikle, &
Seiffer, 1998). This theory postulates that a probe target stim-
ulus is categorized as “old” or “new” at the time of the
impending probe response. In an IR trial, the probe target is
ambiguous in the sense that it is familiar due to its appearance
in the prime, immediately stopping a facilitated “new” re-
sponse, but not familiar enough to be categorized as “old.” It
is this momentary ambiguity that ostensibly leads to the
slowed responses causing negative priming.
To provide support for their theory, Milliken et al. (1998)
conducted experiments where the prime consisted of a single
masked prime word, followed by two interleaved words in the
probe of which one word was to be named. Importantly, no
responsewas required in the prime. Significant negative priming
was nevertheless observed in the “repeated” condition, where
the prime word became the probe target. It was suggested that
this finding is evidence that selecting against a prime distractor is
not necessary for negative priming to occur. However, as Mayr
and Buchner (2007) and others (e.g., Noguera, Ortells, Abad,
Carmona, & Daza, 2007; Tipper, 2001) have pointed out, it is
likely that participants actually selected against the singular
prime, as prime responses needed to be withheld from it. This
finding can therefore be accounted for by either episodic retriev-
al, where a “do-not-respond” tagwas attached to the entire prime
episode, or by an inhibition-based perspective, where the prime
episode involved selective inhibitory processing.
Further, evidence against a temporal discrimination ac-
count comes from Frings and Wühr (2007), using a distractor
repetition manipulation. In a distractor repetition trial, the
prime and probe both contain the same distractor stimulus,
but different target stimuli. Hence, there is “old” information
in the probe display, because the distractor stimulus is the
same as the distractor used in the previous prime and “new”
information, because the target is different from the one in the
prime. The clear prediction from temporal discrimination is
that this conflicting “old” and “new” information should lead
to ambiguity during the impending probe response, and con-
sequently to a slowed response. Conversely, however, exper-
iments that involve distractor repetition conditions, compared
with control conditions, actually produce facilitated responses
rather than slowed responses (e.g., Neumann & DeSchepper,
1991; Nett, Bröder, & Frings, 2016; Stadler & Hogan, 1996).
This is the opposite of what the temporal discrimination the-
ory predicts. For these reasons, both Frings and Wühr and
Mayr and Buchner (2007) conclude that temporal discrimina-
tion is not a viable candidate for explaining negative priming
effects (see also Li, Neumann, & Chen, 2017).
Attempted reconciliation between episodic
retrieval and inhibition-based perspectives
Tipper (2001) attempted to reconcile the opposing views inher-
ent in the episodic retrieval and inhibition-based accounts of
negative priming by pointing out that both encoding factors,
affecting prime display processing, and memory retrieval fac-
tors, affecting probe display processing, are necessary for amore
accurate and complete theory of what underlies the negative
priming effect. Tipper holds that the inhibition-based account
and the episodic retrieval account are not mutually exclusive,
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but rather should be integrated. More specifically, when a probe
target is presented on an IR trial, prior processing episodes as-
sociated with that stimulus will be retrieved. These will include
both information about the stimulus, and a reinstatement of the
internal representations of the distractor. These representations
result from selective attentionmechanisms acting upon the stim-
ulus when it appeared moments before as a prime distractor.
Given that the probe target was inhibited when it appeared as
a prime distractor, it follows that the retrieved episode will also
include that inhibition. Tipper further argues that traditional ac-
counts of inhibition place too much focus on the encoding pro-
cess, whilst the episodic retrieval account over emphasizes the
retrieval process. Consequently, a complete view of the
inhibition-based and memory-based processes involved in neg-
ative priming should include accounts of what transpires at both
encoding and retrieval.
Positive priming
Positive priming (repetition priming) is a phenomenon where-
by presentation of a stimulus facilitates processing on subse-
quent presentation of the same stimulus. Thus positive prim-
ing is evidenced by a faster or less error prone response to
stimuli that have previously been presented compared with
new stimuli. The positive priming literature indicates that
there are two components to positive priming: a short-term
component and a long-term component. The short-term com-
ponent is most evident in the masked form priming paradigm,
whereby the prime is displayed very briefly preceded by a
mask, and immediately followed by a target probe, making
it unable to be identified. This type of positive priming en-
courages the prime and target to merge into one event and has
been shown to disappear if more than a few items intervene
between the prime and the target (Forster & Davis, 1984). In
contrast, positive priming can be long-lasting when the prime
and target are experienced as separate events. For example, it
has been found that positive priming in a lexical decision task
was evident after a 2-day delay (Scarborough, Cortese, &
Scarborough, 1977).
Two major theories have been proposed to account for
positive priming using word stimuli. The first is referred to
as an abstractionist account, whereby positive priming is said
to occur due to an increase in the accessibility of a word’s
abstract lexical representation. For example, Morton (1969)
proposed the logogen model. A logogen is a type of unit that
activates during word recognition and includes information
about the properties of a word including its definition, sound,
and appearance. The logogen model proposes that the presen-
tation of a word lowers the threshold of that word’s logogen,
thus making it more accessible at second presentation. The
second theory is an episodic account and was developed by
Logan (1990). This theory posits that facilitation occurs due to
retrieval of a recent episode of an encountered stimulus. This
facilitation is proposed to occur because memory retrieval acts
faster than the processing it would normally take to classify
the stimulus. For example, when asked to make a lexical de-
cision, the first presentation requires processing to decide
whether or not the item is a word. At the second presentation,
it is assumed that memory retrieval of the last presentation is
faster than having to complete the processing again (Logan,
1990). This episodic account is very similar to Neill and
Valdes’s (1992) episodic retrieval theory, but it uses slightly
different terminology.
Long-term positive priming
In support of an episodic account of positive priming, Bentin
andMoscovitch (1988) conducted a series of experiments that
explored the time course of positive priming effects for words
and unfamiliar faces at lags of 0, 4, and 15 items between first
and second presentations. The first experiment involved a lex-
ical decision task whereby both words and nonwords were
assessed for priming effects over the three lags. This experi-
ment also included a task requiring participants to respond as
to whether an unfamiliar face or “nonface” was a normal hu-
man face. The nonfaces were made by switching the locations
of certain features (i.e., eyes, nose, and mouth). All four cat-
egories of stimuli produced significant positive priming ef-
fects at Lag 0. Conversely, only words produced significant
positive priming effects at lags of 4 and 15 intervening stimuli.
The authors suggested that although these results are consis-
tent with a logogen model they may also be consistent with a
memory perspective, given that the first presentation of an
unfamiliar stimulus may have been unable to create a strong
enough memory trace to sustain effects at longer lags. They
suggested that words are processed more deeply due to their
familiarity, especially if lexical decisions are involved, thereby
creating stronger memory traces. Given that the face versus
nonface task does not require deep processing, participants
may have focused only on superficial features leading to the
formation of a relatively “weak” memory trace. To test this
assumption, the authors conducted a second experiment to
establish whether the positive priming effect found for words
at long lags can be eliminated if the task constrains the partic-
ipants to attend to the superficial attributes of the words rather
than to deeper internal representations. In this experiment,
participants were required to determine whether the first and
last letter of each word or nonword was in alphabetical order.
This new paradigm demonstrated no evidence of positive
priming at lags greater than zero for either words or nonwords.
Overall , the authors concluded that items with a
preexperimental representation (i.e., real words) are more like-
ly to produce a positive priming effect due to their ability to
create a stronger and more accessible trace in memory.
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Additional support for an episodic account comes from a
study that explored positive word priming in a lexical decision
task over lags of 0, 1, 4, or 8 intervening stimuli (Kersteen-
Tucker, 1991). Participants were advised that they would see a
series of letter strings appearing on the screen and that they
needed to respond as to whether the letter string constituted a
word or not. It was found that there was significant positive
priming at all lags but that the magnitude of the effect at Lag 0
was greater than at all other lags independently. The authors
concluded that the long-term positive priming effect was con-
sistent with the idea of participants retrieving a consciously ac-
cessible episodic record of the first presentation of the stimulus.
It has been argued that an abstractionist model of positive
priming (such as the logogen model discussed earlier) strug-
gles to explain long-term positive priming effects (Tenpenny,
1995). If the lexical unit of a word could remain more acces-
sible for a long period of time, the number of these “accessible
units” would become extremely large, making this explana-
tion improbable. It has been suggested that the lexicon is or-
dered by frequency and recency (Taft & Forster, 1976), yet
this explanation similarly struggles to explain a long-term ef-
fect. Any words intervening between the first and second pre-
sentation of the target would push the target word ever more
backward, making it less likely to produce facilitation. Bowers
(2000), however, argues that an abstractionist account of long-
term repetition priming is very plausible. He suggests that
although we encounter many words in daily life, this may
not mean that words in the experimental session are already
primed. Kirsner and Speelman (1996) have reported that, with
a reading rate of 25,000 words a day, a low-frequency word
would be encountered only once every 40 days. It is proposed
that this may account for the lack of long-term repetition prim-
ing found with high-frequency words, as high-frequency
words are more likely to suffer interference effects from lex-
ical competition due of the number of times they are encoun-
tered in everyday life (Bowers, 1999, 2000).
There are also arguments as to why an episodic account may
have difficulty in explaining long-term positive priming. This is
most evident in research that extends priming over a longer time
period than has been discussed so far. Wheeldon and Monsell
(1992) argue that in the case of word recognition, it seems im-
plausible that participants would have time to retrieve an episodic
record, given that in the majority of reaction time experiments
unprimed performance is fast and accurate. This is especially true
in the case of experiments with long lags between prime and
probe displays. These authors designed a series of experiments
in order to minimize the chance of an episodic memory being
retrieved. They achieved this by creating a design where
unprimed performance was efficient and fast, leaving very little
time following the prime trial for elaborative encoding. Further,
they included many new intervening items between the prime
and probe, and gave no explicit encouragement to expect any
kind of repetition. The design was such that the stimulus on the
prime trial was not repeated on the probe trial. This was achieved
by using a picture-naming probe task. In the first experiment,
participants were asked to respond by producing a spoken word
to the picture probe. They had been primed previously with either
a definition prime (a definition appeared on the screen and they
responded with the word) or a printed word prime (a singular
word was presented on the screen that participants needed to read
aloud). This stimulus change, between prime and probe, was
employed to decrease the chance that the probe stimulus could
elicit an episodic memory of the prime stimulus. There was a
short lag condition where prime and probe trials were separated
by 2–7 intervening trials, and a long-lag condition where they
were separated by 60–120 intervening trials. Significant facilita-
tion was observed at both short and long lags when the same
word had previously been produced in response to a definition or
reading a printed word. Facilitationwas, however, greater at short
lags. The authors concluded that the long-lag effect is consistent
with a persistent change in the state of the processing pathway. It
is unclear how this change occurs, however. It may be that pro-
duction of a phonological form is facilitated by the prior produc-
tion of that phonological form. Alternatively, when the partici-
pants produced the word at the prime stage, this activated the
appropriate meaning and it is the meaning itself that facilitated
the response to the probe target picture with the same meaning. It
is also possible that facilitation occurs due to a combination of
both; that is, the phonological form is more easily retrieved when
there has been prior rehearsal of the link between the meaning
and phonological form.
Therefore, Wheeldon andMonsell (1992) also investigated
whether the production of a phonological word form was fa-
cilitated by the prior production of that phonological form in
another experiment that compared positive priming and ho-
mophone priming. In homophone priming, the word form
generated at the prime is in response to a different meaning.
Some of the homophone pairs were homographic (e.g., “bat,”
wherein both meanings have the same spelling) and some
pairs were heterographic (e.g., “son”–“sun,” wherein both
meanings have different spelling). Further, the prime defini-
tions were designed to either induce the same meaning as the
pictured item, or the same word form as the pictured itemwith
an unrelated meaning. For example, if the probe was a picture
of the sun, the two prime definitions supplied were “It rises in
the east and sets in the west” and “Like father like . . . .” If the
long-term positive priming effect found in the first experiment
was purely due to production of the same phonological form,
the homophone priming condition should show significant
facilitation. There was no evidence of homophone priming.
Interestingly, there was evidence of some facilitation in the
homophone condition where the pairs used were homographic
(although this did not reach significance). Heterographic pairs
also showed no facilitation. These results suggest that prior
production of the same phonological word form does not pro-
duce facilitation over long lags.
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Long-term negative priming
In contrast to long-term positive priming, considerably less
research has been undertaken into long-term negative priming.
One of the first studies to explore the idea of long-term neg-
ative priming was conducted by DeSchepper and Treisman
(1996), who used overlapping novel shapes, distinguished
by color, in a same–different decision task to establish the
existence of long-term negative priming after lags of 1, 10,
100, and even 200 trials. This task involved two overlapping
shapes on the left side of the screen (a red and a green shape)
and a white shape on the right side of the screen. Participants
were instructed to ignore the red shape and respond to whether
the green shape was the same or different as the white shape.
Similarly, Grison, Tipper, and Hewitt (2005) found long-term
negative priming, after an average delay of 3 minutes, using
experimentally novel face and object stimuli. These results
clearly support DeSchepper and Treisman’s (1996) observa-
tion of long-term negative priming, but also extend long-term
negative priming effects to meaningful stimuli rather than to
novel “blob” shapes. Grison et al. (2005) concluded that mem-
ory processes were important in long-term negative priming,
but considered it improbable that sustained inhibition could be
maintained over a delay as long as 3 minutes, while attending
to many other intervening stimuli. They also discuss the pos-
sibility that long-term negative priming is dependent on the
subject being able to retrieve only one prior instance of the
ignored distractor. This is consistent with the results of
DeSchepper and Treisman (1996), who used novel shapes,
making it unlikely that the subject had any previously stored
instances of the stimuli. Treisman and DeSchepper (1996),
however, reported no significant long-term negative priming
with meaningful word stimuli using a same–different
matching task with words distinguished by different colors.
They concluded that the many previous interfering tokens
attached to words in memory reduced the likelihood of long-
term negative priming. A similar point was made by Tipper
and Milliken (1996), who reported that unpublished studies
they conducted consistently failed to show negative priming
effects with lags between the prime and probe displays in
excess of 7 seconds. These studies used stimuli previously
seen by participants, thereby having multiple representations
attached to them in memory. They concluded that because of
the mixture of “respond” and “do-not-respond” tags attached
to distractor items, these multiple representations interfered
with retrieval of the appropriate episode.
The current study
The current study aims to further investigate the temporal di-
mension of both negative and positive priming. As discussed
above, both the inhibition-based and episodic retrieval theories
make sound arguments for the findings so far, and there is large
disagreement between these theories about the mechanisms un-
derlying priming effects, most especially at lags. The two fol-
lowing experiments will explore both negative and positive
priming with word stimuli at short and long lags and further
discuss how these results relate to both the inhibition-based
and episodic retrieval accounts of priming.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 employed a paradigm previously used by
Neumann, McCloskey, and Felio (1999). The task involved
naming a prime target followed by a lexical decision (i.e., word
or nonword judgement) to the probe target. Recent research sug-
gests that people are able to quickly create arbitrary associations
between a stimulus and its response, referred to as a stimulus–
response (S–R) binding (Henson, Eckstein, Waszak, Frings, &
Horner, 2014). These bindings can occur with respect to both
responses to prime targets and to prime distractor stimuli.
According to Henson et al. (2014), S–R bindings can cloud the
purity of priming effects. To avoid such unwanted artifacts, these
authors recommend using a large pool of stimuli, combined with
a naming or identification task for the prime stimulus, and a
change of task between prime and probe. For example, if the
prime involved naming the target stimulus, the probe could in-
volve some sort of classification task, such as lexical decision.
They further contend that if these conditions are met, then at the
time of the prime display each stimulus will be associated with a
distinctive response that is not reiterated at the time of the probe
display, and thus cannot moderate the priming effect by S–R
binding. Besides the current study, there are only a few studies
that have followed these important precautions advocated by
Henson and colleagues (i.e., Neumann et al., 1999; Neumann,
Nkrumah, & Chen, 2018; Nkrumah & Neumann, 2018).
In prime and probe couplets, lowercase and uppercase
items appeared immediately above or below one another.
Each prime and probe selection display consisted of an upper-
case distractor word and a lowercase target, both printed in
black. The uppercase distractor was always a word, but the
lowercase probe target was a word in half of the trials, and a
pronounceable nonword in the remaining trials. Target and
distractor items were placed one above the other with minimal
separation, with letter case as the selection cue. The ability to
parse displays into target and distractor was further challenged
by varying the location on the screen of prime displays
(Langley, Overmier, Knopman, & Prod’Homme, 1998).
Like Neumann et al. (1999), participants were required to
name the lowercase word in prime displays while ignoring a
competing uppercase distractor word that appeared at random
above or below the target. Similarly, probe targets were
displayed in lowercase in the presence of a competing upper-
case word, and equally often probe targets formed English
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words or pronounceable pseudowords and required a lexical
decision response. The most critical novel manipulation in the
current study involves the temporal dimension; specifically,
whether long-term negative priming for words can be obtain-
ed. If long-term negative priming exists, there are significant
implications, as it would indicate that previously ignored in-
formation leaves a trace that can alter behavior over an ex-
tended time course (Grison et al., 2005).
Method
Participants Fifty-seven (41 female) participants ages 18–64
years were recruited. Twenty students participated to fulfill
credit for an introductory psychology course, while the re-
maining 37 participants were from the University of
Canterbury and the general public. These participants were
rewarded with a $10 grocery voucher for their participation.
Stimuli and apparatus Stimulus layout and examples of the
IR, control, and nonword trials are presented in Fig. 1. Stimuli
were presented on a Philips 19-inch LCDmonitor in Arial 20-
pt font. The prime stimuli were randomly positioned across
trials either on the left, right, or center of the screen such that
they appeared one third of the time in each position. Probe
displays were always presented in the center of the screen.
When the prime was presented on the left, the visual angle
of the space between the rightmost edge of the prime and the
leftmost edge of the probe was 1.5°. Similarly, when the prime
was presented to the right, there was a 1.5° angle between the
leftmost edge of the prime and the rightmost edge of the
probe. Target and distractor words were presented one above
and one below pseudorandomly, such that 50% of the time the
target appeared in the upper position. The experiment was
generated using E-Prime 2.0. The E-Prime software enabled
reduced separation between the target and distractor stimuli,
such that their closest edges were always 1 pixel apart. The
purpose of this was to increase selection difficulty and conse-
quently the likelihood of obtaining negative priming.
From a pool of 1008 three-letter to eight-letter nouns,
verbs, and adjectives, 240 words were randomly assigned as
targets, and the remaining 768 words were used as filler
words. Nonword stimuli consisted of 144 pronounceable non-
words that were three to seven letters in length. All stimuli
were presented once and only once, except in order to fulfill
the IR condition. Target words were always presented in low-
ercase letters, and distractor words in uppercase letters.
Prior to the main trials, all participants completed 24 prac-
tice trials. Twelve were nonword trials and 12 were control
trials (there were no IR trials during practice). Prime displays
were initially presented for 500 ms, reducing to 400 ms and
then to 200 ms from the ninth trial onward. There were 288
trials in the experiment proper. Of these, 144 were nonword
filler trials and the remaining 144 trials were configured as
follows: 48 control trials, 24 long-term ignored repetition
(LTIR) trials, 24 short-term ignored repetition (STIR) trials,
and 24 word filler trials. To clarify, the LTIR manipulation
required 48 “trials” as each of the 24 analyzed trials also had
to have a linked trial 144 trials earlier to make the manipula-
tion possible. For example, in the first half of the experiment, a
trial had the prime distractor “GRASS,” and 144 trials later,
the probe target was “grass.” This represents an LTIR trial. As
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Fig. 1 Sample trial conditions. For prime displays (dashed outline),
participants named the lowercase word (target) while ignoring the
uppercase word (distractor). Prime displays were visible for 200 ms.
The probe display followed 1,000 ms later. For probe displays,
participants made a lexical decision to the lowercase string (target). The
probe display remained visible until a lexical decision response was
registered. On ignored repetition trials, the ignored uppercase prime
distractor became the target of a lexical decision on the immediately
following probe display (note the repetition of the word box); on
control trials, there was no relationship between words on prime and
probe displays; on nonword trials (half of all trials), the probe target
was not an English-language word. Note prime displays appeared in the
center of the screen or words were centered on a point 70 pixels to the left
or to the right of screen center. Probe displays were always in the center of
the screen. On every display, the spatial separation between target and
distractor items was determined by the need to avoid overlap of lowercase
ascenders and descenders with adjacent uppercase words. All uppercase
and lowercase items were separated by the distance necessary to allow
one screen pixel between the ends of ascenders or descenders and the top
or bottom of the adjacent uppercase word (see the ignored repetition and
control prime displays for examples of the need to avoid overlap with
lowercase ascenders and descenders, and note the absence of ascenders
and descenders in the control probe display in this example). Targets and
distractors were displayed in bold 20-point Arial font, all in black on a
white background
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Half of the trials were “word” trials, and the remaining half
were “nonword” trials. Further, by having half of the targets
appear as nonwords, the proportion of IR trials was kept low.
It has been established that negative priming is more likely to
emerge in these conditions (Mayr & Buchner, 2010; Tse,
Hutchinson, & Li, 2010) because it reduces the incentive to
attend to the prime distractor due to anticipating that it might
be the next probe target.
Design Awithin-subjects design was employed in which the
dependent variables were lexical decision times and lexical
decision error rates. The independent variables were priming
(control vs. IR), and lag (short vs. long). In the STIR condi-
tion, prime and probe displays were in the same prime–probe
couplet, whereas in the LTIR condition, 144 trials intervened
between the prime and the probe displays. Table 1 shows a
sample of the LTIR condition.
Three versions of the experiment were created for the pur-
pose of counterbalancing. Participants were assigned at random
to one of the three counterbalancing versions. The 144 probe
target words were randomly divided into sets A, B, C, D, E, and
F of 24 words each. Participants were assigned at random to
one of three groups to achieve counterbalancing. The experi-
ment was divided into two halves for counterbalancing, as no
comparisons were made between the first and second half of
trials. In the first half of the experiment, participants in Group 1
experienced Set A as IR trials and Set B as control trials; Group
2 experienced Set B as IR trials and Set C as control trials; and
for Group 3, Set C were IR trials and Set Awere control trials.
In the second half of the experiment, participants in Group 1
experienced Set D as LTIR trials and Set E as control trials;
Group 2 experienced Set E as LTIR trials and Set F as control
trials; and for Group 3, Set F were LTIR trials and Set D were
control trials. The entire trial set comprising 144 word and 144
nonword trials (common to all groups) was arranged in random
order. The same random order was used for all participants,
regardless of group. Further details about the current method
of counterbalancing, as they apply to both experiments, are
given in the Method section of Experiment 2.
The final trial was a catch trial that was included to identify
whether participants were able to recall and/or recognize the
prime distractor. The prime display was presented in the same
way as the previous prime displays. However, instead of a
probe display, a blank screen appeared, and the participant
was given 5 s in which to name the prime distractor on the
previous display. If they were unable to do so, they were asked
to select the prime distractor from a display of three uppercase
words.
Procedure Participants were tested individually in a quiet, ar-
tificially lit room. Following description of their task in the
experiment, participants signed an informed consent form.
They were then given printed and verbal instructions to name
the lowercase word on each prime display and to ignore the
uppercase word as best they could and to make a lexical de-
cision to the lowercase item on probe displays as quickly as
possible while trying not to make any errors. Participants were
informed of naming, lexical decision, and procedural errors
during practice trials. No feedback was given during the main
trials. Participants were asked to make the lexical decision
response on a Mitsumi electronics serial mouse. If the stimu-
lus presented was a “word,” participants were asked to press
the left button with their index finger, and if the stimulus was a
“nonword,” they were asked to press the right button with
their middle finger. On each trial, participants first saw a small
fixation cross in the center of the screen for 500 ms. This was
followed after a 200-ms blank screen by the prime display,
which was visible for 200 ms. The screen then remained blank
for 1,000 ms to allow participants time to name the prime
target word aloud before the probe display appeared and was
replaced by the fixation cross after registration of the lexical
decision response. Appearance of the fixation cross indicated
the commencement of the next trial couplet. The short prime
display timing was designed specifically to increase attention-
al demands, which is known to increase the likelihood of a
negative priming effect being observed (e.g., Neumann &
DeSchepper, 1991; Wyatt & Machado, 2013).
The experiment consisted of 289 trials (including the catch
trial) and on average took participants 25 minutes to complete.
After the completion of 144 trials, there was a break of ap-
proximately 1 minute before the second half of the experiment
began. Participants were informed of this and were asked to
press the spacebar to begin trials again when prompted by the
experimenter. At the commencement of the second half, all
participants completed six warm-up trials that were not ana-
lyzed. The experimenter recorded the participant’s verbal
Table 1 A sample of the long lag IR condition in Experiment 1









Note. The prime distractor is the same word as the probe target 144 trials later. The entire trial set was arranged in random order. Hence, the trials
preceding the long-lag IR conditionwere randomized aswere the trials preceding the short-lag IR condition. This condition is identical to the short-lag IR
condition, except for the additional 144 intervening trials
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response to the prime target on a response sheet. The criteria
for a naming error was lenient, such that for a naming error to
be recorded the participant must have either failed to name any
word or failed to name a word that began with the same letter
or sounded at all like the prime target word.
Results
Trials involving either commission or omission naming errors
were treated as failures of selective attention and were thus
removed from the RT analyses, as were trials where partici-
pants committed a lexical decision error. By definition, inves-
tigating mechanisms of selective attention requires partici-
pants to selectively process a target stimulus in the midst of
nontarget information. In our task, confirmation of successful
selection is supplied by a correct prime target word-naming
response. This is a minimal mandate required by both the
inhibition-based and episodic retrieval theories. If the task
instructions were changed to first name the lowercase item,
followed immediately by naming the uppercase item in the
prime display, for example, it would no longer be considered
a selective attention task. Instead, it would be considered a
divided attention task, and neither theory would predict a neg-
ative priming outcome in such a scenario.
Cutoffs for naming and lexical decision errors were 20%.
One participant failed to meet these criteria (for lexical deci-
sion errors). A further 10 participants were eliminated from
further analysis due to a lexical decision error rate exceeding
20% in at least ONE of the control or IR conditions, although
their total lexical decision error rates fell below 20%. These 10
participants did not exceed the overall cutoffs of 20% (naming
errors) and 20% (lexical decision errors). Forty-six partici-
pants remained.
Analysis As can be seen in Fig. 2, there was a substantial
difference in the mean RTs in the short-lag and long-lag
conditions. This was expected, because participants tend to
be faster overall during the second half of the experiment
due to practice effects. More importantly, the IR conditions
produced relatively slower responses than did the control con-
ditions for each lag condition (see Fig. 2). These patterns were
borne out by the analysis of variance (ANOVA) results and
follow-up t tests. A 2 (priming: control vs. IR) × 2 (lag: short
vs. long) repeated-measures ANOVA confirmed that RT was
70 ms faster in the long-lag conditions compared with the
short-lag conditions, F(1, 45) = 18.59, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.292.
RT was 70 ms slower in the IR conditions relative to the
control conditions, F(1, 45) = 7.279, p = .01, ηp
2 = 0.139.
The Lag × Priming interaction was nonsignificant, F(1, 45)
= 1.966, p = .168, ηp
2 = 0.042, indicating that there was no
difference in IR impairment between the short-lag and long-
lag conditions.
Due to the specificity of the aims of the current experiment,
planned comparisons were conducted to determine whether the
STIR condition and/or LTIR condition each independently pro-
duced negative priming. It was demonstrated that RT in the
STIR condition was 86-ms slower than in the short-lag control
condition, t(45) = 4.217, p < .001, 95% CI [45.36, 128.30], d =
0.622, indicating a negative priming effect. When comparing
the long-lag control condition and the LTIR condition, RTwas
54ms slower in the LTIR condition, t(45) = 2.759, p < .01, 95%
CI [14.59, 93.45], d = 0.407, once again demonstrating a neg-
ative priming effect. These analyses confirmed that negative
priming was present at both short and long lags, independently.
Across participants, the lag times between prime distractor and
coupled probe target words for the LTIR manipulation ranged
between 7.22 and 12.40 minutes (M = 8.51 minutes).
Error rates were analyzed in a similar manner and were
larger in the long-lag conditions than the short-lag conditions,
F(1, 45) 9.520, p = .003, ηp
2 = 0.175 (see Table 2). Hence,
although participants were overall faster to respond in the

























Fig. 2 Mean response latency (in milliseconds) as a function of lag and priming. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean
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by committing more errors in the second half. The priming
main effect for error rates was nonsignificant, F(1, 45) =
0.982, p = .327, ηp
2 = 0.021, thus indicating that error rates
were not significantly different between the IR and control
conditions. The Lag × Priming interaction was also nonsignif-
icant, F(1, 45) = 0.002, p = .964, ηp
2 < 0.001. Overall, the
error rate analyses indicate that a speed–accuracy trade-off
does not compromise the negative priming effects obtained
in the response latency data.
Analysis of the catch trial results demonstrated that only one
out of 46 participants was able to recall the prime distractor in
the catch trial. This was not subjected to further analysis, as
clearly there is no evidence of explicit knowledge of the iden-
tity of the prime distractor word here. However, on the subse-
quent recognition portion of the catch trial, 22 out of 45 partic-
ipants were able to correctly choose the prime distractor among
the three options in the catch trial. A binomial test indicated that
a higher proportion of participants recognized the prime
distractor than would be expected by chance (0.33), (p < .01).
Due to this, both the RT and error analyses were rerun with
“catch recognition” added as a between-groups factor. In the
RT analysis, it was found that catch recognition did not signif-
icantly interact with either lag or priming. Further, the main
effect of catch recognition was not significant, F(1, 43) =
1.504, p = .227. In the error analysis, catch recognition did
not interact with either lag or priming, nor did it produce a main
effect, F(1, 43) = 0.261, p = .612. Collectively, these analyses
demonstrate that negative priming across conditions was simi-
lar for participants who were able to identify the catch trial and
participants who were not.1
Discussion
The results show that negative priming persisted over a delay
of 144 trials or approximately 8 minutes. To our knowledge,
this is the first documented finding of a protracted negative
priming effect using common word stimuli. Indeed, other
work using words as stimuli suggests that the negative prim-
ing effect is quite fleeting (DeSchepper & Treisman, 1996;
Neumann et al., 2018). Although Grison et al. (2005) found
long-term negative priming when using experimentally novel
face and object stimuli, they concluded this was due to
memory processes, as it was inconceivable to them that the
inhibition of the prime distractor information could have been
maintained over the delay. Further, the stimuli used by Grison
et al. (2005) were novel, so participants would have had no
prior mental representation of these stimuli. Yet, in the current
experiment, long-term negative priming was found despite the
fact that common word stimuli would carry many preexperi-
ment representations in memory.
Some researchers have claimed that it is unlikely that inhi-
bition lasts through the interference of many intervening trials
(Grison et al., 2005; Treisman & DeSchepper, 1996).
However, at this stage, the possibility that inhibition is the
proximal cause of negative priming cannot be ruled out (Li
et al., 2017). For example, the consequences of having sup-
pressed a prime distractor may result in a raised threshold of
activation for such distractor representations (Neumann &
DeSchepper, 1991). In effect, this could yield negative prim-
ing effects that last over the course of minutes and many
intervening stimuli. Intriguingly, consistent with the work of
Treisman and DeSchepper (see also DeSchepper & Treisman,
1996), what our negative priming results with nonrecycled
common words clearly show is that, just like nonrecycled
novel shapes, the mechanism that affects a prime distractor
can have long-term consequences, despite many intervening
stimuli and time lapses on the order of at least minutes.
In terms of the interpretation of long-term negative priming
from an episodic retrieval perspective, a possible argument is
that when the probe was presented, the most recent memory of
that stimulus would be retrieved. Although this appears to be a
plausible explanation, Treisman and DeSchepper (1996)
claim that the recency effect in retrieval, when words are used,
disappears within two trials such that if the presented itemwas
seenmore than two trials earlier, it will be just as likely that the
retrieval of that item will elicit an “attend” tag as an “ignore”
tag. Consistent with this, memory research shows that the
recency effect is cancelled out if there are intervening working
memory tasks that exceed 15–30 seconds in duration (Bjork&
Whitten, 1974). With respect to the current results, it is possi-
ble that the relevant context occurred 8 minutes beforehand.
Although the task involved a response change between the
prime and its coupled probe, as well as a change from upper-
case to lowercase letters, it could be argued that other features
(e.g., two words always shown on the screen; the same size
and color of the fonts; subjects always responding to the low-
ercase word and ignoring the uppercase word) made the
encoding and retrieval contexts similar. This similarity be-
tween the prime and probe episodes could have made the
Table 2 Mean lexical decision error percentage for each condition in
Experiment 1
Control Ignored Repetition
Short lag 3.79% 4.31%
Long lag 5.97% 6.54%
Total mean response errors 4.92%
1 It should be noted that data were subsequently also analyzed without the
error rate exclusion constraint set for each condition. This meant that only one
participant (rather than 12) was excluded. All trends in the data were the same
under these more lenient exclusion conditions and would not have altered the
interpretation of the results. More specifically, for both the RT and error-rate
analyses, the results were the same regarding all statistically significant effects,
as well as all nonsignificant effects, and would not have altered the interpre-
tation of the results.
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retrieval of the prime episode, including elicitation of the “do-
not-respond” tag attached to the distractor word, accessible
and thus plausibly predict long-lag negative priming. Hence,
the results from the Experiment 1 could be explained either by
an inhibition or by an episodic retrieval account.
Experiment 2
The current experiment aims to pursue these alternative expla-
nations by using a positive priming paradigm that is identical
to the paradigm used in the Experiment 1, with the exception
that it tests for immediate and lagged attended repetition pos-
itive priming effects instead of IR negative priming effects. An
attended repetition (AR) trial involved the target word on the
prime trial being identical to the target word on the probe trial.
In this case, positive priming would be evidenced by faster or
less error-prone responses to the AR conditions compared
with the control conditions. In the current experiment, the
long-term AR (LTAR) manipulation occurred with exactly
the same number of intervening trials as in the IR negative
priming study. Moreover, all word lists, timing of stimuli,
presentation of stimuli, and response requirements were de-
signed to match the previous IR experiment. The only differ-
ence in the current experiment was that the word stimuli from
the previous IR conditions were altered so that instead of the
prime distractor word becoming the probe target, it was the
prime target word that became the probe target word in the
short-term AR (STAR) and LTAR conditions.
If the long-lag IR negative priming observed in the previ-
ous experiment can be explained by an episodic retrieval ac-
count, then it would be expected that long-lag AR positive
priming should be observed in the current experiment. At
the presentation of the probe trial, the prior episode of similar
context (the prime trial) should be retrieved with a “respond”
tag and thus should lead to facilitation. Indeed, there is actu-
ally greater similarity between the prime target and probe tar-
get in the current AR experiment, compared with the IR ex-
periment. In the current experiment, the word and font are
identical in the AR conditions, whereas in Experiment 1 there
was a font change from uppercase to lowercase letters be-
tween prime and probe targets in the IR conditions.
According to episodic retrieval theory, the similarity between
the prime and probe targets in the current experiment should
create optimal conditions for producing priming effects due to
more similar perceptual overlap between the target prime and
target probe words. Under these conditions, in contrast to IR
conditions, it should be even more likely that the probe target
is able to elicit the prime target along with its congruent “re-
spond” tag and thus produce a positive priming effect.
Accordingly, episodic retrieval would predict a greater likeli-
hood of obtaining AR positive priming in Experiment 2, com-
pared with obtaining IR negative priming in Experiment 1.
Method
Participants There were 54 (43 female) participants, ages 17–
46 years. Twenty students participated to fulfill credit for an
introductory psychology course, while the remaining 34 par-
ticipants were recruited from the University of Canterbury and
the general public. These participants were rewarded with a
$10 grocery voucher for their participation.
Stimuli and apparatus All stimuli and apparatus were identi-
cal to Experiment 1, with the exception of STIR trials being
replaced with STAR trials, and LTIR trials being replaced with
LTAR trials. The 144 word trials were configured as follows:
48 control trials, 24 LTAR trials, 24 STAR trials, and 24 word
filler trials.
Design Awithin-subjects design was employed in which the
dependent variables were lexical decision times and lexical
decision error rates. The independent variables were priming
(control vs. AR) and lag (short vs. long). In the STAR condi-
tion, prime and probe displays followed immediately, whereas
in the LTAR condition, 144 trials intervened between the
prime and the probe displays. Table 3 shows a sample of the
LTAR condition. The counterbalancing of the experiment was
identical to Experiment 1, with AR trials replacing IR trials
and LTAR trials replacing LTIR trials. The overall method of
counterbalancingwas designed to eliminate potential word list
artifacts independently for the short-lag conditions and the
long-lag conditions in the two experiments. This was done
by having all of the probe target words in the short-lag condi-
tions in Experiments 1 and 2 counterbalanced across partici-
pants, and all of the probe target words in the long-lag
Table 3 A sample of the long-lag AR condition in Experiment 2









Note. The prime target is the same word as the probe target 144 trials later. This condition is identical to the short-lag AR condition except for the
additional 144 intervening trials
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conditions in Experiments 1 and 2 counterbalanced across
participants. The aim was to ensure that, across participants,
the STAR, STIR, and control conditions were perfectly
counterbalanced with one another. This way, the same probe
target words (in exactly the same trial serial positions) would
be encountered as the target probes in the STAR, STIR, and
control condition, respectively. The same logic applied to the
LTAR, LTIR, and control conditions.
The catch trial differed from Experiment 1 in that if partic-
ipants were unable to recall the prime distractor, they were
asked to select the prime distractor from a list of five upper-
case words that all began and ended with the same letters.
Procedure The procedure did not differ from Experiment 1.
Results
The error cutoff rates were identical to Experiment 1. One
participant failed to meet this criteria (for naming errors). A
further six participants were eliminated from further analysis
due to a lexical decision error rate exceeding 20% in at least one
of the control or AR conditions, although their total lexical
decision error rates fell below 20%. These six participants did
not exceed the overall cutoffs of 20% (naming errors) and 20%
(lexical decision errors). Forty-seven participants remained.
Analysis Figure 3 shows the means and standard errors of the
four conditions. A 2 (priming: control vs. AR) × 2 (lag: short
vs. long) repeated-measures ANOVA confirmed that RT was
faster in the AR conditions compared with the control condi-
tions, F(1, 46) = 36.335, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.441. There was no
statistically significant difference between RT in the short-lag
conditions compared with the long-lag conditions, F(1, 46) =
1.358, p = .250, ηp
2 = 0.029. Importantly, the Lag × Priming
interaction was significant F(1, 46) = 27.701, p < .001, ηp
2 =
0.376, indicating a difference in the magnitude of AR facili-
tation between the short-lag and long-lag conditions.
Due to the specificity of the aims of the current experiment,
planned comparisons were conducted to determine whether the
STAR condition and/or LTAR condition each independently
produced positive priming. It was demonstrated that RT in the
STAR condition was 180 ms faster than in the short-lag control
condition, t(46) = 6.447, p < .001, 95%CI [123.80, 236.22], d =
0.94, indicating a positive priming effect. When comparing the
long-lag control condition and the LTAR condition, RTwas not
significantly different, t(46) = 0.097, p = .923, 95% CI [−33.59,
30.51], d = 0.01, demonstrating that at the long lag, there was no
evidence of positive priming. Across participants, the lag times
between prime distractor and coupled probe target words for the
LTAR manipulation ranged from 7.06 to 12.30 minutes (M =
8.46 minutes). This was comparable to the LTIR lag time in
Experiment 1 (M = 8.51 minutes).
Error rates (presented in Table 4) were similarly analyzed
and were greater in the long-lag conditions than in the short-lag
conditions, F(1, 46) = 23.843, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.341. The
priming main effect for error rates was also significant, F(1,
46) = 4.647, p = .036, ηp
2 = 0.092, indicating that error rates
were significantly greater in the control conditions compared
with the AR conditions. The Lag × Priming interaction was not
statistically significant, F(1, 46) = 0.051, p = .822, ηp
2 < 0.001.
Due to the significant main effect of priming in the error rates,
further analyses were conducted to see if each lag independent-
ly produced a positive priming effect in the error rates. When
comparing the long-lag control and the LTAR conditions, error
rates were not significantly different, t(46) = 1.389, p = .172.
Similarly, there was no significant difference between the error
rates for short-lag control and short-lag AR, t(46) = 1.868, p =
.07. Overall, the error rate analyses indicated that a speed–
accuracy trade-off does not compromise the priming effects


























Fig. 3 Mean response latency (in milliseconds) as a function of lag and priming. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean
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Analysis of the catch trial results demonstrated that only
one out of 47 participants was able to recall the prime
distractor in the catch trial. This was not subjected to further
analysis, but it clearly indicated that there is little evidence of
explicit knowledge of the identity of the prime distractor
word. Coincidentally, it was also the case that only one person
out of 45 was able to recall the catch trial distractor in the
previous IR experiment. On the subsequent recognition por-
tion of the catch trial, 11 out of 46 participants (24%) were
able to correctly choose the prime distractor among the five
options in the catch trial. A binomial test indicated that the
proportion of participants who correctly recognized the prime
distractor was no different than what would be expected by
chance (20%; p = .306).
This forced-choice recognition performance, which is
indicative of random chance guessing on the catch trial,
is closely in line with other negative priming paradigms
that have used a catch trial (e.g., Duscherer & Holender,
2002; Treisman & DeSchepper, 1996). The inability of
nearly all of the participants in Experiments 1 and 2 to
recall the prime distractor word, combined with the
chance recognition performance on the catch trial of
Experiment 2, strongly implies that the prime distractor
words in both experiments are not explicitly identifiable.
Thus any short-term or long-term IR priming effects
produced by distractor words are by definition implicit
memory effects, whereas any short-term or long-term
AR priming effects produced by at tended and
responded-to words are by definition explicit memory
effects.
Discussion The results demonstrate that positive priming
occurred in the STAR condition, as evidenced by a de-
crease in RTs in the AR condition relative to the control
condition. This finding is consistent with much previous
research suggesting that presentation of a stimulus facil-
itates subsequent processing of that same stimulus.
However, it was demonstrated that this effect failed to
persist over the course of several minutes and 144 in-
tervening trials. In combination with the results obtained
in Experiment 1, these results have implications for the
understanding of mechanisms underlying the temporal
dimension of AR positive priming and IR negative
priming as detailed below.
General discussion
Temporal dimension of priming
Experiment 1 reported a large negative priming effect that
endured over the course of 8 minutes and many intervening
trials. The results from Experiment 2, however, showed only a
large immediate positive priming effect. Contrary to the re-
sults from Experiment 1, this effect was not evident in the 8-
minute delay condition. The LTIR effect found in Experiment
1 was, to our knowledge, the first documented finding of long-
term negative priming with word stimuli. Treisman and
DeSchepper (1996), using lags of 100 and 200 intervening
trials, failed to find long-term negative priming with word
stimuli selected from a large pool of words, where words were
presented only once, except to fulfill the IR manipulation.
However, the current experiments differ from that of
Treisman and DeSchepper (1996) in that participants are re-
quired to name a prime word target and then make a lexical
decision to the probe target rather than make a same–different
response to both prime and probe targets. Furthermore, the
selection cue used was letter case rather than color, as was
used in Treisman and DeSchepper (1996). In addition, the
change in response requirement from naming in the prime
display to a lexical decision in the probe display should in-
crease attentional demands. This is important because it has
previously been established that the magnitude of negative
priming tends to increase when the attentional demands, due
to conflict between target and distractor stimuli, are height-
ened (e.g., Moore, 1994; Neumann & DeSchepper, 1991;
Pritchard & Neumann, 2011; Tipper & Cranston, 1985;
Wyatt & Machado, 2013). It is also possible that naming
and/or decision lexical tasks would require a deeper level
(e.g., conceptual or semantic) of processing of critical stimuli,
than making a same–different (more perceptual) judgements
in a matching task. Thus, obtaining long lasting NP with
words could require a conceptual (semantic) rather than a
perceptual level of processing. This could be a critical factor
explaining the inconsistences between the results from
Experiment 1 and those observed by Treisman and
DeSchepper (1996).
Under the current conditions, the word-case selection cue,
proximity of the target and distractor in each display, and
spatial uncertainty and temporal briefness of the prime display
should all contribute to consistent selection difficulty. The
aggregate of these efforts to induce a heightened state of at-
tentional selectivity in an experiment-wide manner was de-
signed to produce the circumstances under which a long-
term negative priming effect with words should be obtained.
Tipper and Milliken (1996) argued that multiple preexper-
iment representations of a familiar distractor stimulus would
lead to a failure to find long-term negative priming. Yet, in
Experiment 1, negative priming was found despite the fact
Table 4 Mean lexical decision error percentage for each condition in
Experiment 2
Control Attended repetition
Short lag 2.88% 1.65%
Long lag 5.05% 4.03%
Total mean response errors 3.06%
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that common word stimuli would carry many preexperiment
representations in memory. This finding is somewhat prob-
lematic for episodic retrieval proponents. From an episodic
retrieval perspective, it could be claimed that the contextual
similarities between the prime and probe episodes would be
enough for the prime distractor part of the episode (with its
“do-not-respond” tag) to be elicited when the probe target
episode is presented (e.g., “warrior” preceded by
“WARRIOR,” respectively, after many intervening attentional
displays and minutes). Although the change from naming a
prime target to making a lexical decision to a probe target 8
minutes later constitutes a large contextual change, there are
also a number of contextual similarities between prime and
probe episodes, such as similarity of size and type of font, two
words being presented simultaneously, and the subjects’ re-
quirement to always respond to the lowercase and ignore the
uppercase item). Thus, it could be argued that these contextual
similarities were sufficient for episodic retrieval to occur in the
LTIR condition of Experiment 1.
Previous research suggests that words are able to produce
facilitation at lagged intervals. However, these intervals were
much shorter than those used in the current experiments.
Among the longest intervals, Kersteen-Tucker (1991) reported
significant facilitation at lags as great as eight intervening
stimuli. Further, Bentin and Moscovitch (1988) found that
words produced significant repetition effects at lags of four
and 15 intervening stimuli, and that there was no difference in
the magnitude of these effects.
Conversely, in a follow-up experiment, Bentin and
Moscovitch (1988) found that this effect was eliminated under
conditions where participants directed their attention only to
superficial features of the words. They concluded that these
conditions led to the creation of a weak memory trace at the
prime such that the probe episode was not sufficient to elicit
this trace. By contrast, it was proposed that retrieval of the
prime episode is the underlying mechanism of facilitation at
lagged intervals whenever such facilitation occurs. It could be
claimed that in the present Experiment 2, although partici-
pants were required to read the target-word aloud, they may
not have had adequate time to access a deeper internal repre-
sentation of the word and thereby create a robust enough
memory trace for episodic retrieval to occur 144 trials later.
If this reasoning held true, however, it would be improbable
that long-term negative priming would be found under the
same task conditions. In this regard, it is noteworthy that in
Experiment 1 the prime distractor was purposely ignored, and
participants should thus be even less likely to access deeper
internal representations of this stimulus than one they had
spoken aloud in the AR condition.
Wheeldon and Monsell (1992) proposed that facilitation at
long intervals is due to a change in the processing pathway
rather than to the retrieval of an episodic trace. These authors
claim that it is unlikely that there would be time for a prime
episode to be retrieved in an experiment such as the current
one due to the limited processing time devoted to the prime
target. Their experiments are some of the only available that
investigate positive priming over intervals, with many inter-
vening trials, more comparable to the present experiment. In
their experiments, the prime presented was either a definition
or a word prime. After a delay of 60 to 120 intervening trials, a
probe appeared in the form of a picture, and participants were
required to respond by producing a spoken word. Significant
positive priming was found at a long lag when participants
were primed with either a definition or a word prime. This
result appears to be inconsistent with the results of
Experiment 2, where no long-lag positive priming was ob-
served with word primes. However, Wheeldon and Monsell
were unsure as to whether it was the production of the phono-
logical word form alone or whether it was the activation of the
word’s meaning that produced the positive priming effect.
They suggested that because their experiment included
definitions and pictures, this may have enticed the
participants to rehearse the link between the phonological
form and the meaning when presented with a word prime.
They further commented that their results may have been
quite different if the experiment had only included word
primes and no definitions or pictures.
Consequently, Wheeldon and Monsell (1992) conducted a
follow-up experiment and reported an absence of facilitation
when using homophones. They concluded that prior produc-
tion of the same phonological word form is inadequate in
generating a positive priming effect over long intervals. In
the present Experiment 2, the prime task involved the partic-
ipants reading aloud the target word. If production of the pho-
nological word form alone is not enough to produce long-lag
priming effects, then it is unsurprising that no long-term pos-
itive priming was evident in Experiment 2. However, it would
also be expected that there would be no long-term negative
priming evident in Experiment 1.
An important feature of the explanation provided by
Wheeldon and Monsell (1992) is that priming effects over
long lags are mediated by how the initial prime is processed.
It was further suggested that the rehearsal of the link between
the phonological word form and its appropriate meaning can
lead to facilitation. In the present experiments, the initial pro-
cessing of the prime stimulus used for the long-lag priming
conditions is very different between Experiment 1 and
Experiment 2. Whilst Experiment 2 requires the participant
to read aloud the prime target, making it consciously accessi-
ble, Experiment 1 requires the participant to ignore the prime
distractor, and it can be assumed that this distractor is not
within conscious awareness. These conditions would not en-
courage rehearsal between the phonological word form and its
meaning. Although such rehearsal may explain facilitation
effects at long lags, when they are found, it does not explain
inhibition effects. It is suggested that the differential
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processing of the prime stimulus between the AR and IR con-
ditions determines whether these effects will be evident over
large delays. It cannot be assumed that the same mechanisms
that underlie long-term facilitation also underlie long-term
inhibition.
The episodic retrieval perspective has difficulty accommo-
dating the absence of long-term AR facilitation. If long-term
IR negative priming results from the retrieval of the prime
distractor with a “do-not-respond” tag and its ensuing incom-
patibility with an upcoming “respond” tag, it would be expect-
ed that facilitation should occur in the LTAR condition of
Experiment 2, because of the compatibility between the con-
gruent “respond” tags. Clearly, there was no facilitatory LTAR
effect, despite observing LTIR impairment in the current
study. As specified earlier, Experiment 1 and Experiment 2
were designed almost identically in that all timing and presen-
tation of stimuli, along with the response requirements from
the participants, and the number of intervening trials in the
delay were identical. Furthermore, the word lists that were
used for the LTIR manipulation in Experiment 1 were the
same word lists used in the LTAR manipulation in
Experiment 2. Therefore, episodic retrieval alone cannot ac-
count for why LTIR occurs when LTAR does not occur under
identical conditions. In fact, the strictures of the episodic re-
trieval account would predict that it should have been more
likely for LTAR to occur than LTIR in these two experiments.
More specifically, since the probe target in the LTAR condi-
tion of Experiment 2 is perceptually identical to the prime
target presented earlier, it should have created the perfect sim-
ilarity gradient for episodic retrieval to occur. The probe target
in the LTIR condition of Experiment 1, however, although
conceptually the same as the prime distractor, differs in that
the probe target is presented in lowercase while the prime
distractor was presented in uppercase. As such, the elicitation
of episodic retrieval in the LTAR condition should be much
more likely to occur since the prime and probe targets matched
in form as well as meaning, whereas in the LTIR the prime
distractor and probe target word matched in meaning, but not
in form. The contrary pattern of findings makes it highly ques-
tionable whether episodic retrieval is the mechanism respon-
sible for the LTIR effect reported here.
Why, then, is it the case that LTIR can be observed in the
absence of LTAR despite using tasks that, under the auspices
of episodic retrieval, should be much more likely to produce
LTAR than LTIR? From our perspective, a noteworthy differ-
ence between the LTIR experiment and the LTAR experiment
is how the initial prime word is processed. In the LTIR exper-
iment, the prime distractor word is ignored by the participant
and processed implicitly such that there is no conscious
awareness of the identity of the prime distractor word. In the
LTAR experiment, however, the prime target word is proc-
essed explicitly as participants are speaking the prime word
aloud and hearing themselves say the word. Based on the
contrasting findings, it appears that explicit processing of a
prime target word is subject to interference not encountered
by the implicit processing of an ignored word. The explicit
processing of the prime target makes it highly likely that par-
ticipants could have noticed that the prime target they read
aloud was sometimes immediately presented as the probe tar-
get (the STAR condition). It is doubtful, however, that any
participant recognized that prime targets sometimes become
probe targets 144 trials later (the LTAR condition). If there
were any anticipatory biases in the current experiments, then
it is plausible that participants could expect that if the prime
target word was presented twice, it would be done immediate-
ly in the same trial. Accordingly, after making a lexical deci-
sion to the probe target in a given trial, any continued activa-
tion of the prime target would be considered unnecessary and
would likely dissipate, leading to the absence of an LTAR
effect. In the LTIR experiment, however, the unconscious pro-
cessing of the prime distractor word would make it improba-
ble that participants would recognize the relationship between
the ignored prime distractor and the probe target, even within
the immediate condition.
Catch trial results and implications
The catch trial for Experiment 1 presented only a final prime
display, followed immediately by a screen asking participants
if they could recall the prime distractor. After 5 seconds, a
display of three words of the same length as the prime
distractor appeared on the screen, and the participants were
instructed to choose which of the three items was previously
presented as the prime distractor. Under these conditions, it
was found that there was a difference between recollection
and recognition memory in the catch trial. While only one
participant was able to recall the prime distractor in the catch
trial when asked, significantly more than a chance number of
participants were able to choose the prime distractor from a list
of three words (recognition test).
Typically, in negative priming research, participants are
unable to recognize the distractor in catch trials. For example,
DeSchepper and Treisman (1996) presented multiple catch
trials throughout their experiment that involved four shapes
being presented on the screen and requesting participants to
choose which one they had seen before. Of these four shapes,
one had previously been an ignored distractor whilst the other
three were experimentally novel. Thus, participants had a 25%
chance of guessing correctly if there was no explicit recogni-
tion of the previously ignored shape. It was found that correct
recognition of ignored shapes averaged 26%, which was not
significantly different from chance. Furthermore, a recent
study found that participants demonstrated intertrial priming
in the absence of explicit recognition memory for target iden-
tification (Jiang, Shupe, Swallow, & Tan, 2016). The expla-
nation for these findings was that the surprise memory test
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used to assess recognition memory may have disrupted mem-
ory for the target item. However, Jiang et al. (2016) also as-
sumed that under some conditions people retain information
about visual attributes of stimuli, and this information may be
in the form of an implicit memory trace.
Recognition is generally considered a form of explicit mem-
ory that requires conscious recollection (Roediger, 1990). This
being the case, it is surprising that participants in Experiment 1
were able to recognize the prime distractor if it is accepted that
no explicit information about the distractor is stored. If the
prime distractor is processed exclusively in the implicit mem-
ory system, explicit recognition should not occur. However, a
study by Johnston, Hawley, and Elliot (1991) demonstrated that
perceptual fluency influenced recognition judgments, but only
when there was no explicit memory for the event. Furthermore,
they reported that accurate recognition judgments can be ob-
tained even when there is no explicit memory for the item. In
Experiment 1, the three word options in the recognition test
were all completely different from one another, and each began
and ended with different letters. It was therefore assumed that
some participants may have recognized some distinguishing
tick marks from the letters of the prime distractor that led to
above-chance guessing of the correct recognition word.
Accordingly, the catch trial in Experiment 2 was redesigned
to test the above assumption. Following a typical prime display,
participants were asked if they could recall the prime distractor.
After a period of 5 seconds, five items were presented on the
screen. All were equal in length to the prime distractor. In
addition, they all began and ended with the same letters as the
prime distractor. For example, if the prime distractor was
“GUIDE,” then the five options presented were GLARE,
GAUGE, GRATE, GUIDE, and GRIPE. Under these new con-
ditions, it was found that participants were now unable to rec-
ognize the prime distractor. This supports the assumption that
participants in Experiment 1 were simply recognizing at least a
subset of perceptual features of the prime distractor to enable
above-chance guessing rather than recognizing the prime
distractor word itself and having an explicit memory of the
prime distractor word. In order for catch trials to accurately
gauge the identification of prime distractor words, future nega-
tive priming experiments that involve words as stimuli should
follow the present Experiment 2 protocols.
Conclusion
Using a large pool of nonrecycled words, the current experi-
ments found evidence of short-term and long-term negative
priming and short-term positive priming, but no long-term
positive priming. The lack of positive priming at long lags is
consistent with previous research suggesting that the activa-
tion of a word’s meaning is necessary to produce a durable,
ongoing facilitation effect. The present experiments were spe-
cifically designed to investigate whether long lag attended
repetition positive priming would occur under identical con-
ditions to long lag ignored repetition negative priming. The
results demonstrate that long-term positive priming is unlikely
to be observed under identical circumstances in which long-
term negative priming is clearly observed. Long-term negative
priming appears to be a more ubiquitous phenomenon than
previously thought.
Taken together, this work provides important new findings
that help to understand differences in the durability of priming
effects between ignored implicit memories and attended ex-
plicit memories. Interference from subsequent explicit infor-
mation was shown to have a larger impact on the durability of
explicit memories, whereas subconscious implicit memory
appears to be less burdened by interference from further im-
plicit or explicit memories. Attended repetition and ignored
repetition manipulations show different capacities for gener-
ating long-term priming effects as revealed by observing dif-
ferent thresholds for quick accessibility upon the reappearance
of their respective probe target words. These results contribute
to a better understanding of the mechanisms underlying selec-
tive attention and question the main tenets of an episodic re-
trieval perspective of priming.
Publisher’s note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdic-
tional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
References
Bentin, S., & Moscovitch, M. (1988). The time course of repetition ef-
fects for words and unfamiliar faces. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 117(2), 148–160.
Bjork, R. A., & Whitten, W. B. (1974). Recency-sensitive retrieval pro-
cesses in long-term free recall. Cognitive Psychology, 6(2), 173–
189.
Bowers, J. S. (1999). Priming is not all bias: Commentary on Ratcliff and
MacKoon (1997). Psychological Review, 106(3), 582–596.
Bowers, J. S. (2000). In defense of abstractionist theories of repetition
priming and word identification. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review,
7(1), 83–99.
Cerf, M., Thiruvengadam, N., Mormann, F., Kraskov, A., Quiroga, R. Q.,
Koch, C., & Fried, I. (2010). On-line, voluntary control of human
temporal lobe neurons. Nature, 467, 1104–1108.
Christie, J. J., & Klein, R. M. (2008). On finding negative priming from
distractors. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 15(4), 866–873.
DeSchepper, B., & Treisman, A. (1996). Visual memory for novel
shapes: Implicit coding without attention. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 22(1), 27–47.
Duscherer, K., & Holender, D. (2002). No negative semantic priming
from unconscious flanker words in sight. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Human Perception & Performance, 28, 839–853.
Forster, K. I., & Davis, C. (1984). Repetition priming and frequency
attenuation in lexical access. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 10(4), 680–698.
Fox, E., & DeFockert, J. W. (1998). Negative priming depends on prime-
probe similarity: Evidence for episodic retrieval. Psychonomic
Bulletin & Review, 5(1), 107–113.
Atten Percept Psychophys
Frings, C., Schneider, K. K., & Fox, E. (2015). The negative priming
paradigm: An update and implications for selective attention.
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 22(6), 1577–1597.
Frings, C., & Wühr, P. (2007). On distractor-repetition benefits in the
negative-priming paradigm. Visual Cognition, 15(2), 166–178.
Grison, S., Tipper, S. P., & Hewitt, O. (2005). Long-term negative prim-
ing: Support for retrieval of prior attentional processes. The
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 58A(7), 1199–1224.
Henson, R. N., Eckstein, D., Waszak, F., Frings, C., & Horner, A. J.
(2014). Stimulus–response bindings in priming. Trends in
Cognitive Sciences, 18(7), 376–384.
Jiang, Y. V., Shupe, J. M., Swallow, K.M., & Tan, D. H. (2016). Memory
for recently accessed visual attributes. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition. Advance online
publication. https://doi.org/10.1037/xlm0000231
Johnston, W. A., Hawley, K . J., & Elliott, J. M. (1991). Contribution of
perceptual fluency to recognition judgments. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition,
17(2), 210–223.
Kersteen-Tucker, Z. (1991). Long-term repetition priming with symmet-
rical polygons and words. Memory & Cognition, 19(1), 37–43.
Kirsner, K., & Speelman, C. (1996). Skill acquisition and repetition prim-
ing: One principle, many processes? Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition. 22(3), 563–575.
Langley, L. K., Overmier, J. B., Knopman, D. S., & Prod’Homme,M.M.
(1998). Inhibition and habituation: Preserved mechanisms of atten-
tional selection in aging and Alzheimer’s disease. Neuropsychology,
12(3), 353–366.
Li, L., Neumann, E., & Chen, Z. (2017). Identity and semantic negative
priming in rapid serial visual presentation streams. Attention,
Perception, & Psychophysics, 79(6), 1755–1776.
Logan, G. D. (1988). Toward an instance theory of automatization.
Psychological Review, 95(4), 492–527.
Logan, G. D. (1990). Repetition priming and automaticity: Common
underlying mechanisms? Cognitive Psychology, 22(1), 1–35.
Mayr, S., & Buchner, A. (2007). Negative priming as a memory phenom-
enon: A review of 20 years of negative priming research. Journal of
Psychology, 215(1), 35–51.
Mayr, S., & Buchner, A. (2010). Episodic retrieval processes take place
automatically in auditory negative priming. European Journal of
Cognitive Psychology, 22(8), 1192–1221.
Milliken, B., Joordens, S., Merikle, P. M., & Seiffert, A. E. (1998).
Selective attention: A reevaluation of the implications of negative
priming. Psychological Review, 105(2), 203–229.
Moore, C. M. (1994). Negative priming depends on probe-trial conflict:
Where has all the inhibition gone? Perception & Psychophysics,
56(2), 133–147.
Morton, J. (1969). Interaction of information in word recognition.
Psychological Review, 76(2), 165–178.
Neill, W. T., & Valdes, L. A. (1992). Persistence of negative priming:
steady state or decay?. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 18(3),
565–576.
Nett, N., Bröder, A., & Frings, C. (2016). Distractor-based stimulus–
response binding retrieve decisions independent of motor programs.
Acta Psychologica, 171, 57–64.
Neumann, E., & DeSchepper, B. G. (1991). Costs and benefits of target
activation and distractor inhibition in selective attention. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition,
17(6), 1136–1145.
Neumann, E., & DeSchepper, B. G. (1992). An inhibition-based fan
effect: Evidence for an active suppression mechanism in selective
attention. Canadian Journal of Psychology, 46(1), 1–40.
Neumann, E., & Levin, J. R. (2018). Can the use of seven key manipula-
tions and predicted pattern testing bring more clarity to negative prim-
ing investigations? American Journal of Psychology, 131(1), 3–18.
Neumann, E., McCloskey, M. S., & Felio, A. C. (1999). Cross-language
positive priming disappears, negative priming does not: evidence for
two sources of selective inhibition. Memory & Cognition, 27(6),
1051–1063.
Neumann, E., Nkrumah, I. K., & Chen, Z. (2018). Excitatory and inhib-
itory priming by attended and ignored non-recycled words with
monolinguals and bilinguals. Memory, 30, 1–12.
Nkrumah, I. K., & Neumann E. (2018). Cross-language negative priming
remains intact, while positive priming disappears: Evidence for two
sources of selective inhibition. Journal of Cognitive Psychology,
30(3), 361–384.
Noguera, C., Ortells, J. J., Abad, M. J. F., Carmona, E., & Daza, M. T.
(2007). Semantic priming effects from single words in a lexical
decision task. Acta Psychologica, 125, 175–202.
Peterson, L. R., & Peterson, M. J. (1959). Short-term retention of indi-
vidual verbal items. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 58(3),
193–198.
Pritchard, V. E., & Neumann, E. (2011). Classic Stroop negative priming
effects for children and adults diverge with less-conflicting and non-
conflicting conditions. American Journal of Psychology, 124(4),
405–419.
Roediger, H. L. (1990). Implicit memory: Retention without remember-
ing. American Psychologist, 45(9), 1043–1056.
Scarborough, D. L., Cortese, C., & Scarborough, H. S. (1977). Frequency
and repetition effects in lexical memory. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Human perception and performance, 3(1), 1–17.
Sperling, G. (1960). The information available in brief visual presenta-
tions. Psychological Monographs: General and Applied, 74(11), 1–
29.
Stadler, M. A., & Hogan, M. E. (1996). Varieties of positive and negative
priming. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 3, 87–90.
Strayer, D. L., & Grison, S. (1999). Negative identity priming is contin-
gent on stimulus repetition. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Human Perception & Performance, 25(1), 24–38.
Taft, M., & Forster, K. I. (1976). Lexical storage and retrieval of
polymorphemic and polysyllabic words. Journal of Verbal
Learning and Verbal Behavior, 15(6), 607–620.
Tenpenny, P. L. (1995). Abstractionist versus episodic theories of repeti-
tion priming and word identification. Psychonomic Bulletin &
Review,2(3), 339–363.
Tipper, S. P. (2001). Does negative priming reflect inhibitory mecha-
nisms? A review and integration of conflicting views. The
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 54A(2), 231–343.
Tipper, S. P., & Cranston, M. (1985). Selective attention and priming:
Inhibitory and facilitatory effects of ignored primes. The Quarterly
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 37(4), 591–611.
Tipper, S. P., & Milliken, B. (1996). Distinguishing between inhibition-
based and episodic retrieval-based accounts of negative priming. In
A. F. Kramer, M. G. H. Coles, & G. D. Logan (Eds.), Converging
operations in the study of visual selective attention (pp. 337–363).
Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Treisman, A., & DeSchepper, B. (1996). Object tokens, attention, and
visual memory. In T. Inui & J. McClelland (Eds.) Attention and
Performance 16: Information integration in perception and commu-
nication (pp. 15–46). Cambridge: MIT Press.
Tse, C. S., Hutchison, K. A., & Li, Y. (2010). Effects of contextual sim-
ilarity and target-repetition proportion on negative priming in RT
distributional analyses. Journal of Experimental Psychology,
37(1), 180–192.
Wheeldon, L. R., &Monsell, S. (1992). The locus of repetition priming of
spoken word production. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental
Psychology, 44A(4), 723–761.
Wyatt, N., & Machado, L. (2013). Evidence inhibition responds reactive-
ly to the salience of distracting information during focused attention.
PLOS ONE, 8(4), e62809.
Atten Percept Psychophys
